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Summary 
In many low-income countries, agriculture is mostly rain-fed and yields highly depend on climatic 
factors. Furthermore, farmers have little access to traditional crop insurance, which suffers from 
high information asymmetry and transaction costs. Insurances based on meteorological indices 
could fill this gap since they do not face such drawbacks. However their implementation has been 
slow so far.  In this article, we first describe the most advanced projects that have taken place in 
developing countries using these types of crop insurances. We then describe the methodology that 
has been used to design such projects, in order to choose the meteorological index, the indemnity 
schedule and the insurance premium. We finally draw an agenda for research in economics on this 
t o p i c .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  m o r e  r e s e a r c h  i s  n e e d e d  on implementation issues, on the assessment of 
benefits, on the way to deal with climate change, on the spatial variability of weather and on the 
interactions with other hedging methods. 
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In many low-income countries, agriculture is mostly rainfed and 
yields highly depend on climatic factors. Furthermore, farmers 
have little access to traditional crop insurance, which suffers from 
high information asymmetry and transaction costs. Insurances 
based on meteorological indices could fill this gap since they do 
not face such drawbacks. However their implementation has been 
slow so far.  
 
In this article, we first describe the most advanced projects that 
have taken place in developing countries using these types of crop 
insurances. We then describe the methodology that has been used 
to design such projects, in order to choose the meteorological 
index, the indemnity schedule and the insurance premium. We 
finally draw an agenda for research in economics on this topic. In 
particular, more research is needed on implementation issues, on 
the assessment of benefits, on the way to deal with climate change, 
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In traditional crop insurance, the insurer pays an indemnity to the farmer when crops are 
damaged, typically by drought, hail or frost (the so-called "multirisk" crop insurance). Since 
the farmer benefits from an information asymmetry vis-à-vis the insurer, the latter must resort 
to a costly damage assessment to check at least part of the claims. As a consequence, such 
insurances exist only where they are largely subsidized by the government. We can quote as 
examples PROPAGRO in Brazil, INS in Costa Rica, CCIS in India, ANAGSA and the 
FONDEN program in Mexico, PCIC in the Philippines, Agroseguro in Spain, and FCIC in the 
USA, for which every respective government pays for more than half of the premiums 
(Miranda and Glauber, 1997, Molini et al., 2007). Unfortunately, Least Developed Countries 
(LDC) governments do not have the financial resources to finance these subsidies at a large 
scale.  
 
Insurances Based on Meteorological Indices (IBMIs) may constitute an interesting alternative, 
especially for LDCs. The difference with traditional crop insurance is that indemnification is 
not triggered by damage to the crop, but by the level of a meteorological index, which is itself 
correlated to crop yield. IBMIs were initiated by agricultural economists debating on their 
attractiveness for wheat producers in Australia (Bardsley and Davenport, 1984, Quiggin 1986, 
Patrick, 1988).  The idea was then applied to LDCs with the aim of developing the 
agricultural sector (Skees et al., 1999) and a formal framework was provided by Mahul, 2001. 
IBMIs are analogous to weather derivatives, which appeared in the 1990s in the energy sector. 
Those financial products reduce the impact of a harmful weather on firms whose margins 
widely depend on climate, such as energy suppliers. 
 
The main advantage of IBMIs over traditional insurance is that there is no need for damage 
assessment. Thanks to the absence of information asymmetry (Goodwin and Mahul, 2004) the 
principal (the insurer) does not have to check the agent’s (the insured farmer) statement. 
Moreover, IBMIs allow a quick payment of the indemnity (Alderman and Haque, 2006), 
provided that the organization producing the weather data is efficient enough, as noticed by 
Giné et al., 2008 on the Indian case. 
 
The downside is the so-called basis risk, i.e. the fact that the correlation between crop yield 
and the meteorological index cannot be perfect. Indeed the relationship between weather and 
yield is complex and depends on field-specific features such as the slope, the soil quality, and 
the availability of alternative water sources. Moreover, many hazards independent of the 
weather, such as pests, do impact yields, especially in LDCs. Finally, a high spatial variability 
of the weather (section 3.4 below) also contributes to the basis risk, since it would be too 
costly to install a rain gauge, let alone a complete meteorological station, in every field.  
 
The scientific literature on IBMIs is developing quickly. Several recent papers present the 
main IBMIs implemented: cf. Barnett et al., 2007, Barnett et al., 2008 and Collier et al., 2009. 4 
 
Others focus on a particular project or region: for example, Berg et al. (2009) focus on 
Burkina Faso, Giné et al. (2007, 2008) on India, Hess and Syroka (2005) on Malawi, Mahul 
and Skees (2007) on Mongolia, Turvey, 2001 on Ontario (Canada). Some papers deal with 
one aspect of the IBMIs: Barnett et al. (2008) with the ability of IBMIs to tackle poverty 
traps, Chantarat et al. (2007) with their contribution to famine prevention, Hochrainer et al. 
(2007) with their robustness to climate change. 
 
In this paper, we provide a general overview of the methods used and difficulties faced by 
IBMIs. In a first part, we describe the main IBMI experiments in developing countries, i.e. in 
India, Malawi and Ethiopia. In part two, we present the methods used to design the key 
features of an IBMI. In the third part, we draw an agenda for economic research on IBMIs. 
Given the focus of the present journal, we voluntarily oriented our work towards the reduction 
of risk in rural areas of developing countries more than towards the optimization of risk 
management in rich countries agricultural sector. 
1 The main experiments in developing countries to date 
Most IBMI projects implemented in developing countries aim at insuring individual farmers. 
Malawi and India are currently the countries with the biggest experience. In this part, we also 
present a rather different kind of IBMI, which was implemented in Ethiopia at a ‘macro’ 
scale. 
1.1 India 
India is the country with the most extensive experience of IBMI as around 150,000 clients 
purchased a private insurance policy and about 700,000 a public one (Barrett et al., 2009). 
The public IBMI, called Varsha Bima, was included in 2007 the National Agricultural 
insurance Scheme, itself implemented by a paragovernmental insurance organization: the 
Agricultural Insurance Company of India. In that frame, indemnifications for farmers are 
triggered by deficit and excess of rainfall during the Kharif (monsoon season) and high 
temperatures and frost during the Rabi, the winter growing season.   
 
We focus here on the private initiative jointly offered by an insurance company (ICICI 
Lombard) and a local micro-finance institution (BASIX), the first IBMI implemented at a 
large scale. The policy scheme began in 2003 in Andhra Pradesh, covering groundnut and 
castor crop against drought on three phenological phases of the monsoon season. Farmers can 
purchase separate contracts for each phase. It was limited to farmers who contracted a loan to 
BASIX until 2004. It was then extended to non-borrowing farmers and to other regions (36 
districts within 8 Indian states) and other crops (cotton, oranges and others). Insurance 
distribution was benefiting from the micro-finance institution networks and their design from 
the expertise and subsidies of international organizations, such as the Commodity Risk 
Management Group (CRMG) of the World Bank.  
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However the results of the policy have to be put into perspective in regard to the low 
premiums (less than US$5 per acre, Giné et al, 2007) and very low observed subscription rate 
of such experiments (less than 3% in Andhra Pradesh and less than 20% in Gujarat according 
to Giné et al., 2008). Those experiments lead to statistical studies about insurance take-up and 
especially its determining factors (Cole et al., 2009, Giné et al., 2007 and Giné et al., 2008, 
cf. section 3.1).  
1.2 Malawi 
In Malawi, two projects jointly offering an IBMI with a credit for high quality seeds were run 
by the Insurance Association of Malawi in association with a cooperative of local growers (cf. 
section 3.5.2). The initial objective was to limit loan default payment, which precludes the 
development of these credits. Indeed, when the rainy season is bad, so is the yield and farmers 
are unable to repay the credit. For this reason, the maximum payout corresponds to the total 
loan value. The pilot program (launched during the 2005-2006 season) concerned groundnut 
producers of some regions (Hess and Syroka, 2005). The second (2006-2007) was spread out 
over the whole country; it was extended to maize producers and for the first time the loan is 
also able to be used for the purchase of fertilizers. The first round concerned less than 900 
farmers and the second one about 2500 (of which 1710 were groundnut farmers, Barnett and 
Mahul, 2007). In the pilot program, drought was defined as less than 75 percent of the long-
run average of cumulative rainfall over the rainy season. 13 of the 22 government-managed 
meteorological stations, showing satisfying quality standards in terms of missing values, were 
taken into account; they provided 40 years of rainfall data. The impact of this program could 
not be estimated due to a good rainy season in 2006.  
1.3 Ethiopia 
In Ethiopia, a pilot program was initiated by the World Food Program (WFP) during the 2006 
and 2008 seasons, with a technical assistance from the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) and the World Bank. The premium was offered by the WFP major donors and the 
product was insured by the reinsurance company AXA Re (now PARIS Re). If any indemnity 
had been paid, it would have been redistributed by the Ethiopian government to about 60,000 
households in 2006 and 316,000 in 2008 (Barrett et al., 2009) that cultivate wheat, millet, 
cowpea and maize. 
 
The index was based on the cumulative rainfall, computed with a network of 26 
meteorological stations across the country. The complex annual rainfall pattern in Ethiopia 
pointed out the necessity to go thoroughly into growing strategies. Indeed, in some regions 
there are two distinct rainy seasons, which induce two possible farming strategies depending 
on the earliness of the first one: farmers can either choose to sow one long-cycle crop or to 
sow two different short-cycle crops.  
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There are also many other programs in pilot phase, in development or discontinued in 
Argentina, Bangladesh, Canada, China, Ethiopia, Honduras, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Mali, Nicaragua, Ukraine, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Vietnam and Zambia 
(cf. Bruin et al., 2009 and Barnett et al., 2008). These experiences cannot be presented here 
because of space constraints.  
2 Methods 
2.1 Meteorological indices 
To minimize the basis risk, the chosen meteorological index has to be a good predictor of 
yields, and especially of bad yields. Some products insure against cold temperatures or frost 
(South Africa), others against excess of water during harvest (India) or against floods 
(Vietnam), but most of them insure against a lack of rain. Hence, we only study the last 
category in this section. 
2.1.1 Basic rainfall indices 
• The cumulative rainfall during the growing season (which, in the tropics, typically 
corresponds to the rainy season) is the simplest quantifier of water availability. However, the 
impact of a lack of rain depends on the crop growth phase. Hence, in practice, the growing 
season is split in several sub-periods, generally 3 to 7, and an indemnity is paid whenever a 
lack of rain occurs in one of these sub-periods. It was the case in the Malawian and the Indian 
experiments (cf. §1.3 and §1.4). The amount of rainfall that triggers the payment of an 
indemnity (the "strike") as well as the amount of indemnity differ across the sub-periods and 
are based on agro-meteorological knowledge. Moreover, very light daily rains (typically < 1 
mm/day) and daily rains exceeding a given cap (60 mm/day in most Indian insurance 
schemes) are generally not taken into account in the cumulated rainfall. Indeed, very light 
daily rains generally evaporate before being used by the plant, while rains exceeding a given 
cap run off and cannot be used either.  
 
Such indices were applied in India and during the first Malawian experiment. They were also 
used in the Ethiopian scheme where payments were triggered by a low cumulative rainfall 
from March to October, compared to the 30-years average. Crop specific indices were 
computed by weighting 10-days periods cumulative rainfalls according to their relative impact 
on yields.  
 
• The Available Water Resource Index (AWRI; Byun  et al., 2002), based on effective 
precipitations of the previous days, is a slight improvement on the cumulative rainfall. In a 
nutshell, available water is estimated by simulating reduction of soil water stocks due to 
runoff, evapotranspiration and infiltration. Reduction is represented as a weighted sum of 
previous rains on a defined period (often 10 days) with time-decreasing factors.  
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These indices are better predictors of yields if they are computed using the actual sowing date 
(or a sowing window) to trigger the beginning of the growth cycle. Imposing an arbitrary 
sowing date or window in the insurance policy increases the basis risk hence reduces the 
benefit of the IBMI. However, inquiring after actual sowing date would be very costly. 
Hence, in practice, especially in India and Malawi, the sowing date used to determine the crop 
growth phases is imposed by the insurer. 
2.1.2 Water stress indices 
Water stress indices are based on the idea that crop yields are proportional to the satisfaction 
of crop needs for water resource. The Water Resource Satisfaction Index (WRSI) is the main 
water stress index. It is defined as the ratio of actual evapotranspiration (ETa) to maximum 
evapotranspiration (ETM). ETa corresponds to an estimation of the quantity of water actually 
evaporated while ETM corresponds to the quantity of water that would evaporate if the water 
requirements of the plant were fully satisfied. This index was developed by the FAO and used 
in different IBMI schemes in India and in the second Malawi experiment, computed on a 10-
days period.  
2.1.3 Mechanistic crop models 
Mechanistic dynamic models simulate crop physiological growth depending on available 
environmental factors. Their precision in yields estimation is in theory greater, but they need 
very detailed input data, particularly time series at the field level. Such data are rarely 
available for large areas especially in developing countries. 
 
The DSSAT model is used by Osgood et al., 2007 in East Africa and Diaz Nieto et al., 2006 
in Nicaragua. It is however difficult to use such complex models (Osgood  et al., 2007) 
because of a high sensitivity to parameters calibration. On the other hand they can be used to 
assess the shortcomings of other methods. They also allow yield simulation under higher 
levels of inputs than actually used by the farmers, which is useful since IBMIs may create an 
incentive for such intensification that is unobservable ex ante (cf. § 3.2.3). 
2.1.4 Drought indices 
Those indices use temperatures and rainfall to compute air and/or soil dryness. The 
Selyaninov drought index, also called Selyaninov Hydrothermal Ratio, and the Ped index only 
captures the air dryness.  Both have been used by Breustedt et al., 2004 in an ex-ante IBMI 
scheme study designed for Kazakhstan. Their calculus has the convenience of only requiring 
rainfall and temperatures data. The Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI: Palmer, 1965) was 
used for the study of an insurance scheme in Morocco (Skees, 2001). It requires temperature, 
latitude, water retention capacity of soils and precipitations data, usually ran on a decadal 
basis.   8 
 
2.1.5 Satellite imagery data 
Satellite imagery data allows computing vegetation indices such as the Leaf Area Index (LAI) 
or the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI). The latter evaluates crop canopy 
photosynthesis – more precisely light absorption – calculated from the difference between 
near infrared and red beams, divided by their sum: NDVI = (NIR-RED)/(NIR+RED). This 
technique is more and more frequently used for food crisis early warning, livestock 
management, and forecasts of forage production. It has been implemented by Agriculture 
Financial Services Corporation (AFSC) in Alberta (Canada), Spain, and Mexico for grassland 
and forage insurance (Hartell et al., 2006) and by the Word Bank in 2005 in Mongolia (Mahul 
and Skees, 2007) for livestock. The NDVI can hardly discriminate between pastures and 
cultivated areas and it is computed with a delay period because of the potential presence of 
clouds. However improvements in this field are very quick so that imagery resolution 
increases regularly and new technologies could emerge in the near future. 
2.1.6 Index choice criteria 
Minimizing the basis risk is the main criterion to compare those indices. The correlation 
between yields and index values is the simplest way to deal with such a choice, but more 
complex objective functions exist and are discussed in section 3.2.1. It is fundamental, in 
order to improve the attractiveness for farmers, to evaluate the correlation between yields and 
index values for low yields, i.e. for situations in which an indemnity should be paid. However, 
complexity limits the transparency and acceptability of IBMIs and data availability is often 
limited, especially in developing countries. There is thus a trade-off between index 
transparency, readability for farmers, data availability and thus simplicity on the one hand, 
and the index ability to reflect low yields (or minimize the basis risk) on the other hand.  
2.2 Insurance policy design 
2.2.1 Typical indemnity schedule 
As it has been brought forward by Vedenov and Barnett, 2004, the typical indemnity schedule 
is defined by three parameters (λ,S,M). The threshold level of the meteorological index, called 
the strike (S), triggers payouts for insured farmers. A slope related parameter (λ with: 0 < λ < 
1) determines the index level: λ.S, from which payouts are bound to a maximum (M). Figure 1 
displays the two opposite insurance contract shapes with λ equalling 0 and 1 (the latter 
corresponding to a lump sum transfer M) and an intermediary case. The contract shape is 
based on the fact that crop growth depends positively on the weather index (e.g. water 
availability), from a maximum stress meaning zero yield, to a point where water is no longer a 







Figure 1: Usual shapes of IBMI policies. 
      
In many real-world IBMIs, the indemnity schedule is more complex. In particular, as 
explained above (§2.1.3), partial payouts are computed for each crop growth phase, and the 
total indemnity is the total of these partial payouts. This is the case in Malawi (Osgood, 2007) 
and in Senegal (Mahul et al., 2009) or in many Commodity Risk Management Group 
(CRMG) schemes in India. In this frame, a maximum insurance payout is defined for each 
growth phase and the sum of insurance payouts is also bounded on the whole growing period.  
2.2.2 Optimization of policy parameters  
In most cases, the indemnity schedule and the parameters are set without a formal 
optimization process, on the basis of expert knowledge. Typically, the strike will be set 
according to agronomists’ views of under what level rainfall starts to be a limiting factor for 
crop yield, and the maximum payment may be set at the value of inputs (fertilizers, seeds, 
pesticides…) or at the value of the crop in a normal year. For instance, the strike is set 
according to an agronomic relation linking yields and water availability in Vedenov and 
Barnett, 2004. 
  
In some cases, some of the parameters at least are set following an explicit optimization 
process. The function to optimize differs across authors. Some maximize an expected utility 
function featuring risk aversion, more precisely a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) 
function (Berg et al., 2009). Others minimize the semi-variance of income after insurance 
(Vedenov and Barnett, 2004). Income after insurance is the value of observed yield plus the 
indemnity minus the premium, and the semi-variance is  the squared difference of yields 
inferior to the long-run average yield, relatively to this long run level. Finally, Osgood et al., 
2007 minimize the square of the difference between payouts and expected losses, the latter 
being defined as yields under the first quartile of simulated yield distribution.  
2.2.3 Computing the expected value and distribution of the indemnity  
The insurance premium depends on the expected value of the indemnity and on a measure of 
the probability distribution of payouts, i.e. indemnities (cf. section 2.2.4 below). There are 10 
 
two methods to compute these values; Historical Burn Analysis (HBA) and Historical 
Distribution Analysis (HDA) also called index modelling.  
 
Historical Burn Analysis (HBA) is the simplest method. It consists in converting the historical 
values (possibly cleaned and detrended, cf. § 3.3.1 below) directly into payouts. HBA gives a 
first indication of the mean and range of possible payouts of a weather contract, from which 
parameters such as the expected value and the standard deviation of the payouts can be 
calculated. Moreover, HBA does not require any assumption on distribution function 
parameters, contrarily to HDA. The disadvantage of HBA is that it gives a limited view of 
possible index outcomes: it may not capture the possible extremes, and it may be overly 
influenced by individual years and measurement errors in the historical dataset (World Bank, 
2005). 
 
Historical Distribution Analysis (HDA) consists in fitting a statistical distribution function to 
the historical values and converting values from this distribution to payouts. The distribution 
has to be postulated. The expected payout and the measures of the risk, such as standard 
deviation and VaR99, (cf. §2.2.5 below) can be calculated either by Monte-Carlo simulations 
from the distribution or, for simple distributions and indemnity schedules, analytically (World 
Bank, 2005). Rare events even if not present in the historical series are treated in a better way 
with this method. Moreover outliers and measurement errors will have less of an impact on 
results than they do in the case of HBA. 
 
The only formal comparison of the accuracy of the two methods seems to be a working paper 
by Jewson (2004) who concludes that HDA is significantly better than HBA when there is 
little uncertainty on the statistical distribution postulated in the HDA method.  
2.2.4 Loading factor calibration 
The insurance premium is higher than the expected indemnity (except if the insurance is 
subsidized) since it includes the administrative costs as well as the cost of the risk taken by 
the insurer. We will only discuss the second item here. The cost of the risk for the insurer 
depends on the correlation of this particular risk with the pre-existing risk portfolio of the 
insurer (Meze-Hausken  et al., 2009). Abstracting from this idiosyncratic element, two 
methods are used for evaluating the additional cost of risk taking (Henderson, 2002): 
 
• In the Sharpe ratio method, the margin is proportional to the standard deviation of cost (δ(i), 
with i the indemnities) for the insurer: 
 
α × δ (i)                                                                                                                                     (1) 
 
Where α is the Sharpe ratio. 
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• In the Value at Risk (VaR), this margin is proportional to a risk of a defined occurrence 
probability. For example, VaR99 is the cost of the event that occurs with a probability of 1%: 
 
β × [VaR99 − E(i)]                                                                                                                     (2) 
 
The latter method is more adapted to high risk with low probability and cannot be applied 
with HBA (cf. 2.2.3 above). An ex post statistical analysis on a case study in India, run by 
Giné et al., 2007, shows that a large part of the payouts are due to extreme events: half of 
them in that case were due to the worse 2% climatic events. According to Hartell et al., 2006, 
α is chosen between 15 and 30 % and β between 5 and 15% (and between 5 and 7% according 
to Hess and Syroka, 2005, and Osgood et al., 2007 who deal with IBMI case studies). For 
instance in the case of Malawi, the VaR method applied with a factor β of 5% leads to an 
increase of 17.5% of the premium and a final premium rate of 11% (Hess and Syroka, 2005). 
3 A research agenda 
3.1 Implementation issues and institutional aspects 
A pre-existing distribution network, like that of a financial institution, reduces marketing 
costs. This factor and farmers’ trust in supplying institutions could be understood as the major 
factors of the success of Indian programs. There is a crucial need to link the very low 
subscription rate in pilot projects to theoretical assumptions. The literature mainly raised the 
effect of human capital or other capacity barriers in empirical works. In particular, Giné and 
Yang (2009) point out the role of educational background in the particular case of a joint 
supply of insurance and loan in Malawi. 
 
The first reason given by farmers that could explain the low take-up is the misunderstanding 
about the product (Giné, 2008). The authors found that the take-up rate falls with the extent to 
which household credit constraint binds and more surprisingly with a self-reported risk 
aversion indicator. The only explanation of this latter effect is that uncertainty about the 
product reliability drives the take-up choice. Cole et al., 2009 point out the trust in the 
supplying institution and credit constraints as explanations of low take-up rates. Many on-
going studies (for instance the EUDN ILO program: microinsurance innovation facility
1 
granted many demand related research topics) are concentrating upon trust, readability of the 
underlying index and the contract, transparency of the process from index measure to funding.  
 
Farmers’ acceptance and perceptions about the product are also at stake in explaining the low 
take-up rates. Perceptions are also linked to capacity issues; the role of the apprehension of 
probability seems to be embedded with bounded rationality. Patt et al., 2009 list recent field 




on commercial supplier honesty and his will to improve production conditions. Patt et al., 
2010 compare the impact of traditional communication tools such as oral or written 
presentations of indexed contracts relatively to role-playing games on two groups of farmers, 
controlling for their respective educational level. The experiment was designed for this 
purpose and took place in two different sites in Ethiopia and one in Malawi. They found a 
high correlation between insurance understanding and the desire to take up but no evidence of 
any superiority of role-playing games relatively to oral or written presentations. According to 
the authors, the misunderstanding of insurance policies after training could be due to an 
insufficient educational background. They also observed existence of an ‘endowment effect’ 
brought forward by the prospect theory, which would justify to go beyond the expected utility 
approach. 
 
There are also many institutional barriers restraining IBMI implementation. It is in particular 
crucial that the country institutional framework and regulatory environment be adapted to 
private insurers, e.g. allowing contract enforcement at low costs (Carpenter and Skees, 2005 
and Henderson, 2002). It is the case of South Africa, India (Indian Insurance Regulatory and 
Development Authority, IRDA), Peru and the Philippines (Insurance Commission of the 
Philippines: Insurance Code of 1974) that adapted their legislations to facilitate private micro-
insurance initiatives (Wiedmaier-Pfister and Chatterjee, 2006).  
3.2 Assessment of the benefits 
3.2.1 Quantifying the benefits of a lower income variability 
The IBMI literature includes almost exclusively ex-ante analyses, and the rare ex-post 
empirical analyses are either very descriptive (Giné, 2007) or focused on the explanation of 
participation (Giné, 2008) and technology adoption (Giné et al., 2009).  
Ex ante analyses are either based on expected utility or on the minimization of a risk 
indicator. Berg et al. (2009) rely on expected utility maximization and find an increase of 
certainty equivalent income of about 0.5 to 3%, depending on the cultivated crop: gains for 
millet and sorghum growers are very low, but gains for groundnut and maize growers are 
more significant. Vedenov and Barnett (2004) minimize several risk indicators, including the 
semi-variance of the insured revenue and the value-at-risk (VaR). Both papers also 
demonstrate the risk of over-fitting the data when the same dataset is used for optimizing the 
contract parameters and for quantifying the benefits: in several simulations, an IBMI yields a 
seemingly good outcome when applied to the dataset on which it was optimized, but a much 
poorer outcome when applied to another dataset for validation. 
Breustedt et al., 2008 review the tools used for evaluating risk reduction through IBMIs. They 
note that such downside loss risk measures, as well as the mean-variance criterion, 
overestimates the benefit of purchasing crop insurance. They highlight the scarcity of works 13 
 
that deal with farm-level yields and the need for analyses of risk reduction at the level of 
individual farmers.  
The challenge is to quantify the risk reduction and to compare it with the reduction in average 
income due to the presence of a loading factor. Risk minimization is indeed costly in terms of 
average income level as long as there is a non-subsidized loading factor. Downside risk 
measures, that only incorporate the risk minimization objective, are thus insufficient if the 
insurance has a price higher than the actuarial fair rate. There is still a need for weighting risk 
reduction and average income level in the utility function (either a risk aversion parameter in 
the expected utility case or an ad-hoc parameter in the case of the mean-variance criterion).  
3.2.2 Production intensification 
Limited wealth prevents farmers from implementing risky strategies that are more productive 
on average: use of fertilizers, improved cultivars, etc. Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1993 
evaluate at 30% the average shortfall in farm profit of Indian farmers that undertake low risk / 
low yields productive choices due to risk aversion. Farm models and farmers’ risk 
management are thus also needed to acknowledge the use of intensifying techniques that seem 
to be a cornerstone in increasing yields.  
 
Insured farmers could be incited to undertake more risky growing strategies and thus to adopt 
new technologies and invest in fertilizers. The incitation to intensify the production process is 
part of the interest of such products, in spite of its assessment complexity in absence of large 
scale empirical data. There is a real need for ex-post impact assessment taking into account 
those endogenous impacts of IBMI implementation.  
 
Yields time series with different levels of fertilizers and different crops and varieties can be 
simulated by crop models  for estimating potential production under various weather 
conditions. Such models are typically calibrated on the potential yields observed in 
experimental stations. However, in LDCs, real-farm yields are much lower than potential 
yields observed in experimental stations, for various reasons: pests, lack of available labour at 
crucial stages, low availability of inputs… For instance quality mineral fertilizer distribution 
seem to be quite slow to emerge in spite of a poor soil fertility; see Duflo et al., 2009 for a 
review of underlying mechanisms. 
3.2.3 Modelling poverty traps mechanisms 
Poor households are facing a double constraint constituted of a tied budget (limited access to 
credit market) and a subsistence imperative. Often, in order to reach minimum nutritional 
needs, households under-invest in productive capital, including in human capital through 
health and education expenditures. Facing risk indeed creates an incentive for poor 
households to stock non-productive subsistence assets (food) with low-return and low-risk 
(Zimmerman and Carter, 2003, cf. also section 3.5.1 for a short review of the impact of other 14 
 
informal risk coping strategies). According to Chetty and Looney (2006), consumption 
smoothing mechanisms and especially their cost should thus be inquired when assessing the 
welfare gain of any social insurance. Barnett et al., 2008 review such mechanisms and their 
crucial role in designing index based risk transfer products. However, to our knowledge, no 
IBMI has been assessed within a formal dynamic model featuring the possibility of poverty 
traps.  
3.3 Robustness to climate change 
Due to global warming, there is an upward trend in local temperatures in almost every region 
in the world. If the index of an IBMI includes temperatures but does not account for this 
trend, the calculation of the expected indemnity is biased. The continuation of the upward 
trend in temperature is very likely over the next decades, but the magnitude of this trend is 
highly uncertain. First, according to the last IPCC (2007) synthesis report, global warming in 
2100 could be between 1.4 and 5.8 °C, depending both on climate sensitivity and on 
greenhouse gas emissions. Second, uncertainty on local warming is even higher than that on 
global warming.  
 
In some regions, e.g. West Africa, rainfall data also exhibit trends, which may be due to 
global warming, to natural climate variability and/or to changes in land use. The difficulty is 
higher than for temperature since in many regions, like again West Africa, climate models 
diverge on whether global warming will entail an increase or a decrease in rainfall. Moreover, 
not only the average, but also the inter-annual variability of the rainfall level may change due 
to global warming. 
 
Simple detrending methods, based on past data, are routinely used in IBMI design (Jewson 
and Penzer, 2005). However, they cannot correctly account for complex non-stationarities, 
like the succession of humid and dry decades in the Sahel (Dai et al., 2004). Nor can they deal 
with the above-mentioned uncertainty on future local climates. Hence, the presence of a trend 
in the data used to build the index can incite private suppliers to turn away from local 
markets. It was the case in Morocco (Skees et al., 2001) in spite of the twenty years of 
precipitations data and the provision promises made by the government. 
 
Hochrainer et al., 2007 test the robustness of an IBMI in Malawi using climate forecasts 
generated by the MM5 and PRECIS regional climate models and put into question its long run 
sustainability until 2080.  
3.4 Climate spatial variability and the scaling of insurances  
Risk covariance is a major source of insurance market failure in LDC’s and explains the high 
subsidization rate of agricultural insurances, according to Barnett et al. (2008).  
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Spatial risk correlation is a major impediment of IBMI implementation. It increases income 
variance for the insurer, hence the insurance premium. The only ways to lower the variance of 
income for a given spatial variability of shocks are to insure a larger area, allowing a better 
pooling, and/or to transfer a part of the risk to an international insurer or reinsurer through risk 
layering. For instance, reinsurance was needed for drought insurance in Ethiopia. In this 
Ethiopian context, Meze-Hausken et al., 2009 make a HDA studying insurance provision on 
30 years and 15 stations and conclude that pooling over the country limits the need for capital 
requirement at the beginning of the period.  
 
Spatial variability reduces this problem but increases the basis risk for a given rain gauge 
network density. In practice the maximum distance to the nearest meteorological station is set 
between 20 and 30 km (20 km in Malawi and Senegal, and until 30 in most cases in India and 
in Canada according to Hartell et al., 2006). Increasing the density of rain gauges raises 
substantially IBMI management costs (installation, operation and maintenance) creating a 
trade-off between the management cost and the basis risk.  
 
In most IBMIs, only the closest meteorological station is taken into account to compute the 
indemnity. However, interpolation methods can also be used to infer the meteorological index 
realization over a geo-referenced grid (Paulson and Hart, 2006). Method complexity differs 
from simple and determinist ones
2 to stochastic ones as such as Kriging, based on Gaussian 
multivariate statistical distributions. 
3.5 Interactions with other hedging methods 
Before listing possible complementarities with other formal hedging methods, we first discuss 
the potential substitution with existing informal methods that deal with risk-bearing (Arnott 
and Stiglitz, 1991, Bloch et al., 2008). One has also to recall that potential substitutability 
with risk mitigation strategies, such as infrastructures investments (for example irrigation 
projects) that could be crowded out by insurance supply, is also able to limit the scope of such 
products. 
3.5.1 Informal practices 
We distinguish between risk management (or mitigation: ex ante) and risk coping (or 
adaptation: ex-post) methods following Dercon, 2005. Since Besley, 1995 and Fafchamps, 
2003 already reviewed the literature on those informal methods, we only mention them briefly 
below. 
                                                            
2 Simple linear weighting, decreasing with distance of stations around or squared weighting like the Inverse 
Distance Weighted Averaging (IDWA). 16 
 
Risk coping 
Providing formal insurance could have a negative impact on informal risk coping networks, as 
noted by Alderman and Haque, 2007. Transfers from migrants, neighbours, family or friends 
are well described in Fafchamps, 2007, and their importance for IBMIs literature was recently 
analyzed by Barnett et al., 2008. Farmers are incited to pool spatially the risks they face for 
instance by using private transfers. Pan, 2008 however found evidence that transfers have a 
minor impact on risk pooling. Kazianga and Udry, 2006 only found evidence of a very low 
risk sharing among households facing climatic shocks in Burkina Faso. A potential 
explanation is that having recourse to informal credit could also be very costly (Collins et al., 
2009). 
Risk management 
Other beforehand strategies such as self-insurance (savings, livestock and other stocks 
adjustment such as mortgage of personal goods, Collins et al., 2009) crop choice, 
intercropping are also a possible substitution.   
 
Empirical studies point out the very low use of livestock as a buffer stock (Fafchamps et al., 
1998, Lybbert et al., 2004, Lentz et Barrett, 2005 et Unruh, 2008). They rely almost 
exclusively on self-insurance and smooth consumption by adjusting stocks of stored grain that 
could also be very costly. For instance stored grain undergoes very high depreciation rates 
associated with different degradation sources, such as moisture, rodents and insects.  
 
Finally we can argue that the cost of both informal methods limit their attractiveness 
especially as compared to formal insurance products. Dercon et al., 2008 review the works 
evaluating those cost, highlighting the need for health and crop micro-insurances.  
3.5.2 Inputs loan 
Combination of insurance with input credits represents a double interest. First it allows the 
use of the distribution networks of micro-finance institutions. Then it mitigates the default 
risk for lenders, lowering credit interest rate all other things being equal. The joint effect of 
both products, with a possible farmers’ default on loan is formalized by Dercon and 
Christiaensen, 2007 in the Ethiopian context. Lowering the default rate indeed reduces the 
potential moral hazard and adverse selection induced by loans supplied at a given interest rate. 
Screening and monitoring costs thus drop, lowering loans prices. Finally providing a 
mandatory insurance jointly with a product that is far more expensive limits the adverse 
selection that lies in the insurance product by limiting the incitation for risky producers to buy 
insurance product.  
 
Giné and Yang, 2009 however show evidence that loan for high-yielding hybrid maize and 
groundnut seeds in Malawian field does not increase the take-up rate and even possibly lower 
it. To reach this conclusion they run a randomized experiment comparing take-up rates of 17 
 
farmers that subscribe to a loan with a mandatory IBMI priced at an actuarially fair rate to 
those of a control group for whom a loan without insurance was supplied. The use of high-
yielding seeds rose compared to the previous years but, surprisingly, insurance seems to have 
had a negative impact (by roughly 13 percentage points) on loan take-up. A potential 
explanation mentioned by the authors is that farmers already are implicitly insured by the 
limited liability serving as collateral in the loan contract. However, the low number of 
observations and a significantly higher educational level in the control group are limiting the 
scope of such results. 
3.5.3 Seasonal weather forecasts 
Seasonal weather forecasts provide probabilistic information on the next season in various 
regions of the world. If these forecasts become more accurate in the future, farmers could 
adjust their productive choices according to the forecasts. In particular, they may use more 
risky but potentially more productive crops or techniques in years with a good forecast. Meza 
et al. (2008) provide a survey on the assessments of the value of these forecasts in agriculture.  
 
Forecasts are necessarily imperfect so that weather related risk remains. In this context, 
insurance may be a complement for weather forecasts by allowing production intensification 
with limited risk. Carriquiry and Osgood (2008) and Osgood et al. (2008) study the synergies 





Although index-based insurances have gained a growing attention in the last ten years, a lot of 
research remains to be done before a robust conclusion on their potential benefit can be 
reached. A part of this research is mainly related to agro-meteorology (e.g. the work on new 
and improved indices, including the use of data from satellites) but further research in 
economics is also needed, in at last five directions.  
 
First, there is a need to explain the often low subscription rates and why they differ across 
projects. Cultural and institutional issues clearly matter here. Second, the quantification of 
benefits is still in its infancy. Third, although weather insurance is sometimes presented as an 
adaptation tool against climate change, global warming can threaten the viability of index-
based insurances. Fourth, spatial issues, such as the optimal density of weather stations and 
the ambiguous impact of spatial covariance deserve more attention. Last but not least, the 
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